physical working capacity test

   1) Programs and the Complexity of Human Mental Processes

   In my opinion, none of [these programs] does even remote justice to the complexity of human mental processes. Unlike men, "artificially intelligent" programs tend to be single minded, undistractable, and unemotional. (Neisser, 1967, p. 9)

   2) Artificial Intelligence Is an Engineering Discipline

   Future progress in [artificial intelligence] will depend on the development of both practical and theoretical knowledge.... As regards theoretical knowledge, some have sought a unified theory of artificial intelligence. My view is that artificial intelligence is (or soon will be) an engineering discipline since its primary goal is to build things. (Nilsson, 1971, pp. vii-viii)

   3) A Sceptical View of Artificial Intelligence

   Most workers in AI [artificial intelligence] research and in related fields confess to a pronounced feeling of disappointment in what has been achieved in the last 25 years. Workers entered the field around 1950, and even around 1960, with high hopes that are very far from being realized in 1972. In no part of the field have the discoveries made so far produced the major impact that was then promised.... In the meantime, claims and predictions regarding the potential results of AI research had been publicized which went even farther than the expectations of the majority of workers in the field, whose embarrassments have been added to by the lamentable failure of such inflated predictions....

   When able and respected scientists write in letters to the present author that AI, the major goal of computing science, represents "another step in the general process of evolution"; that possibilities in the 1980s include an all-purpose intelligence on a human-scale knowledge base; that awe-inspiring possibilities suggest themselves based on machine intelligence exceeding human intelligence by the year 2000 [one has the right to be skeptical]. (Lighthill, 1972, p. 17)

   4) Just as Astronomy Succeeded Astrology, the Discovery of Intellectual Processes in Machines Should Lead to a Science, Eventually

   Just as astronomy succeeded astrology, following Kepler's discovery of planetary regularities, the discoveries of these many principles in empirical explorations on intellectual processes in machines should lead to a science, eventually. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   5) Problems in Machine Intelligence Arise Because Things Obvious to Any Person Are Not Represented in the Program

   Many problems arise in experiments on machine intelligence because things obvious to any person are not represented in any program. One can pull with a string, but one cannot push with one.... Simple facts like these caused serious problems when Charniak attempted to extend Bobrow's "Student" program to more realistic applications, and they have not been faced up to until now. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 77)

   6) The Meaning of a Symbolic Description

   What do we mean by [a symbolic] "description"? We do not mean to suggest that our descriptions must be made of strings of ordinary language words (although they might be). The simplest kind of description is a structure in which some features of a situation are represented by single ("primitive") symbols, and relations between those features are represented by other symbols-or by other features of the way the description is put together. (Minsky & Papert, 1973, p. 11)

   7) The Principle of Artificial Intelligence

   [AI is] the use of computer programs and programming techniques to cast light on the principles of intelligence in general and human thought in particular. (Boden, 1977, p. 5)

   8) Artificial Intelligence Recognizes the Need for Knowledge in Its Systems

   The word you look for and hardly ever see in the early AI literature is the word knowledge. They didn't believe you have to know anything, you could always rework it all.... In fact 1967 is the turning point in my mind when there was enough feeling that the old ideas of general principles had to go.... I came up with an argument for what I called the primacy of expertise, and at the time I called the other guys the generalists. (Moses, quoted in McCorduck, 1979, pp. 228-229)

   9) Artificial Intelligence Is Psychology in a Particularly Pure and Abstract Form

   The basic idea of cognitive science is that intelligent beings are semantic engines-in other words, automatic formal systems with interpretations under which they consistently make sense. We can now see why this includes psychology and artificial intelligence on a more or less equal footing: people and intelligent computers (if and when there are any) turn out to be merely different manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon. Moreover, with universal hardware, any semantic engine can in principle be formally imitated by a computer if only the right program can be found. And that will guarantee semantic imitation as well, since (given the appropriate formal behavior) the semantics is "taking care of itself" anyway. Thus we also see why, from this perspective, artificial intelligence can be regarded as psychology in a particularly pure and abstract form. The same fundamental structures are under investigation, but in AI, all the relevant parameters are under direct experimental control (in the programming), without any messy physiology or ethics to get in the way. (Haugeland, 1981b, p. 31)

    10) There Are Many Types of Reasoning

   There are many different kinds of reasoning one might imagine:

    Formal reasoning involves the syntactic manipulation of data structures to deduce new ones following prespecified rules of inference. Mathematical logic is the archetypical formal representation. Procedural reasoning uses simulation to answer questions and solve problems. When we use a program to answer What is the sum of 3 and 4? it uses, or "runs," a procedural model of arithmetic. Reasoning by analogy seems to be a very natural mode of thought for humans but, so far, difficult to accomplish in AI programs. The idea is that when you ask the question Can robins fly? the system might reason that "robins are like sparrows, and I know that sparrows can fly, so robins probably can fly."

    Generalization and abstraction are also natural reasoning process for humans that are difficult to pin down well enough to implement in a program. If one knows that Robins have wings, that Sparrows have wings, and that Blue jays have wings, eventually one will believe that All birds have wings. This capability may be at the core of most human learning, but it has not yet become a useful technique in AI.... Meta- level reasoning is demonstrated by the way one answers the question What is Paul Newman's telephone number? You might reason that "if I knew Paul Newman's number, I would know that I knew it, because it is a notable fact." This involves using "knowledge about what you know," in particular, about the extent of your knowledge and about the importance of certain facts. Recent research in psychology and AI indicates that meta-level reasoning may play a central role in human cognitive processing. (Barr & Feigenbaum, 1981, pp. 146-147)

    11) Programs Are Beginning to Do Things That Critics Have Asserted to Be Impossible

   Suffice it to say that programs already exist that can do things-or, at the very least, appear to be beginning to do things-which ill-informed critics have asserted a priori to be impossible. Examples include: perceiving in a holistic as opposed to an atomistic way; using language creatively; translating sensibly from one language to another by way of a language-neutral semantic representation; planning acts in a broad and sketchy fashion, the details being decided only in execution; distinguishing between different species of emotional reaction according to the psychological context of the subject. (Boden, 1981, p. 33)

    12) The Synthesis of Man and Machine

   Can the synthesis of Man and Machine ever be stable, or will the purely organic component become such a hindrance that it has to be discarded? If this eventually happens-and I have... good reasons for thinking that it must-we have nothing to regret and certainly nothing to fear. (Clarke, 1984, p. 243)

    13) The Thesis of Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence (GOFAI)

   The thesis of GOFAI... is not that the processes underlying intelligence can be described symbolically... but that they are symbolic. (Haugeland, 1985, p. 113)

    14) Artificial Intelligence Provides a Useful Approach to Psychological and Psychiatric Theory Formation

   It is all very well formulating psychological and psychiatric theories verbally but, when using natural language (even technical jargon), it is difficult to recognise when a theory is complete; oversights are all too easily made, gaps too readily left. This is a point which is generally recognised to be true and it is for precisely this reason that the behavioural sciences attempt to follow the natural sciences in using "classical" mathematics as a more rigorous descriptive language. However, it is an unfortunate fact that, with a few notable exceptions, there has been a marked lack of success in this application. It is my belief that a different approach-a different mathematics-is needed, and that AI provides just this approach. (Hand, quoted in Hand, 1985, pp. 6-7)

    15) Four Kinds of Artificial Intelligence

   We might distinguish among four kinds of AI.

   ♦ Nonpsychological AI

   Research of this kind involves building and programming computers to perform tasks which, to paraphrase Marvin Minsky, would require intelligence if they were done by us. Researchers in nonpsychological AI make no claims whatsoever about the psychological realism of their programs or the devices they build, that is, about whether or not computers perform tasks as humans do.

   ♦ Weak Psychological AI

   Research here is guided by the view that the computer is a useful tool in the study of mind. In particular, we can write computer programs or build devices that simulate alleged psychological processes in humans and then test our predictions about how the alleged processes work. We can weave these programs and devices together with other programs and devices that simulate different alleged mental processes and thereby test the degree to which the AI system as a whole simulates human mentality. According to weak psychological AI, working with computer models is a way of refining and testing hypotheses about processes that are allegedly realized in human minds.

   ♦ Strong Psychological AI

... According to this view, our minds are computers and therefore can be duplicated by other computers. Sherry Turkle writes that the "real ambition is of mythic proportions, making a general purpose intelligence, a mind." (Turkle, 1984, p. 240) The authors of a major text announce that "the ultimate goal of AI research is to build a person or, more humbly, an animal." (Charniak & McDermott, 1985, p. 7)

   ♦ Suprapsychological AI

   Research in this field, like strong psychological AI, takes seriously the functionalist view that mentality can be realized in many different types of physical devices. Suprapsychological AI, however, accuses strong psychological AI of being chauvinisticof being only interested in human intelligence! Suprapsychological AI claims to be interested in all the conceivable ways intelligence can be realized. (Flanagan, 1991, pp. 241-242)

    16) Determination of Relevance of Rules in Particular Contexts

   Even if the [rules] were stored in a context-free form the computer still couldn't use them. To do that the computer requires rules enabling it to draw on just those [ rules] which are relevant in each particular context. Determination of relevance will have to be based on further facts and rules, but the question will again arise as to which facts and rules are relevant for making each particular determination. One could always invoke further facts and rules to answer this question, but of course these must be only the relevant ones. And so it goes. It seems that AI workers will never be able to get started here unless they can settle the problem of relevance beforehand by cataloguing types of context and listing just those facts which are relevant in each. (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, p. 80)

    17) Form and Content Are Not Fundamentally Different

   Perhaps the single most important idea to artificial intelligence is that there is no fundamental difference between form and content, that meaning can be captured in a set of symbols such as a semantic net. (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    18) The Assumption That the Mind Is a Formal System

   Artificial intelligence is based on the assumption that the mind can be described as some kind of formal system manipulating symbols that stand for things in the world. Thus it doesn't matter what the brain is made of, or what it uses for tokens in the great game of thinking. Using an equivalent set of tokens and rules, we can do thinking with a digital computer, just as we can play chess using cups, salt and pepper shakers, knives, forks, and spoons. Using the right software, one system (the mind) can be mapped into the other (the computer). (G. Johnson, 1986, p. 250)

    19) A Statement of the Primary and Secondary Purposes of Artificial Intelligence

   The primary goal of Artificial Intelligence is to make machines smarter.

   The secondary goals of Artificial Intelligence are to understand what intelligence is (the Nobel laureate purpose) and to make machines more useful (the entrepreneurial purpose). (Winston, 1987, p. 1)

    20) Mathematical Logic Provides the Basis for Theory in AI

   The theoretical ideas of older branches of engineering are captured in the language of mathematics. We contend that mathematical logic provides the basis for theory in AI. Although many computer scientists already count logic as fundamental to computer science in general, we put forward an even stronger form of the logic-is-important argument....

   AI deals mainly with the problem of representing and using declarative (as opposed to procedural) knowledge. Declarative knowledge is the kind that is expressed as sentences, and AI needs a language in which to state these sentences. Because the languages in which this knowledge usually is originally captured (natural languages such as English) are not suitable for computer representations, some other language with the appropriate properties must be used. It turns out, we think, that the appropriate properties include at least those that have been uppermost in the minds of logicians in their development of logical languages such as the predicate calculus. Thus, we think that any language for expressing knowledge in AI systems must be at least as expressive as the first-order predicate calculus. (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987, p. viii)

    21) Perceptual Structures Can Be Represented as Lists of Elementary Propositions

   In artificial intelligence studies, perceptual structures are represented as assemblages of description lists, the elementary components of which are propositions asserting that certain relations hold among elements. (Chase & Simon, 1988, p. 490)

    22) Definitions of Artificial Intelligence

   Artificial intelligence (AI) is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sorts of things that minds can do. Some of these things are commonly regarded as requiring intelligence: offering a medical diagnosis and/or prescription, giving legal or scientific advice, proving theorems in logic or mathematics. Others are not, because they can be done by all normal adults irrespective of educational background (and sometimes by non-human animals too), and typically involve no conscious control: seeing things in sunlight and shadows, finding a path through cluttered terrain, fitting pegs into holes, speaking one's own native tongue, and using one's common sense. Because it covers AI research dealing with both these classes of mental capacity, this definition is preferable to one describing AI as making computers do "things that would require intelligence if done by people." However, it presupposes that computers could do what minds can do, that they might really diagnose, advise, infer, and understand. One could avoid this problematic assumption (and also side-step questions about whether computers do things in the same way as we do) by defining AI instead as "the development of computers whose observable performance has features which in humans we would attribute to mental processes." This bland characterization would be acceptable to some AI workers, especially amongst those focusing on the production of technological tools for commercial purposes. But many others would favour a more controversial definition, seeing AI as the science of intelligence in general-or, more accurately, as the intellectual core of cognitive science. As such, its goal is to provide a systematic theory that can explain (and perhaps enable us to replicate) both the general categories of intentionality and the diverse psychological capacities grounded in them. (Boden, 1990b, pp. 1-2)

    23) The Computer Can Not Be a Model of the Mind

   Because the ability to store data somewhat corresponds to what we call memory in human beings, and because the ability to follow logical procedures somewhat corresponds to what we call reasoning in human beings, many members of the cult have concluded that what computers do somewhat corresponds to what we call thinking. It is no great difficulty to persuade the general public of that conclusion since computers process data very fast in small spaces well below the level of visibility; they do not look like other machines when they are at work. They seem to be running along as smoothly and silently as the brain does when it remembers and reasons and thinks. On the other hand, those who design and build computers know exactly how the machines are working down in the hidden depths of their semiconductors. Computers can be taken apart, scrutinized, and put back together. Their activities can be tracked, analyzed, measured, and thus clearly understood-which is far from possible with the brain. This gives rise to the tempting assumption on the part of the builders and designers that computers can tell us something about brains, indeed, that the computer can serve as a model of the mind, which then comes to be seen as some manner of information processing machine, and possibly not as good at the job as the machine. (Roszak, 1994, pp. xiv-xv)

    24) Computers Will Not Always Be Inferior to Human Brains

   The inner workings of the human mind are far more intricate than the most complicated systems of modern technology. Researchers in the field of artificial intelligence have been attempting to develop programs that will enable computers to display intelligent behavior. Although this field has been an active one for more than thirty-five years and has had many notable successes, AI researchers still do not know how to create a program that matches human intelligence. No existing program can recall facts, solve problems, reason, learn, and process language with human facility. This lack of success has occurred not because computers are inferior to human brains but rather because we do not yet know in sufficient detail how intelligence is organized in the brain. (Anderson, 1995, p. 2)

πνεῦμα, ατος, τό (πνέω; Aeschyl., Pre-Socr., Hdt.+. On the history of the word s. Rtzst., Mysterienrel.³ 308ff).

① air in movement, blowing, breathing (even the glowing exhalations of a volcanic crater: Diod S 5, 7, 3)

ⓐ wind (Aeschyl. et al.; LXX, EpArist, Philo; Jos., Ant. 2, 343; 349; SibOr 8, 297) in wordplay τὸ πνεῦμα πνεῖ the wind blows J 3:8a (EpJer 60 πνεῦμα ἐν πάσῃ χώρᾳ πνεῖ. But s. TDonn, ET 66, ’54f, 32; JThomas, Restoration Qtrly 24, ’81, 219–24). ὀθόνη πλοίου ὑπὸ πνεύματος πληρουμένη MPol 15:2. Of God ὁ ποιῶν τοὺς ἀγγέλους αὐτοῦ πνεύματα who makes his angels winds Hb 1:7; 1 Cl 36:3 (both Ps 103:4).

ⓑ the breathing out of air, blowing, breath (Aeschyl. et al.; Pla., Tim. 79b; LXX) ὁ ἄνομος, ὅν ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς ἀνελεῖ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ 2 Th 2:8 (cp. Is 11:4; Ps 32:6).

② that which animates or gives life to the body, breath, (life-)spirit (Aeschyl. et al.; Phoenix of Colophon 1, 16 [Coll. Alex. p. 231] πν.=a breathing entity [in contrast to becoming earth in death]; Polyb. 31, 10, 4; Ps.-Aristot., De Mundo 4 p. 394b, 8ff; PHib 5, 54 [III B.C.]; PGM 4, 538; 658; 2499; LXX; TestAbr A 17 p. 98, 19 [Stone p. 44] al.; JosAs 19:3; SibOr 4, 46; Tat. 4:2) ἀφιέναι τὸ πνεῦμα give up one’s spirit, breathe one’s last (Eur., Hec. 571; Porphyr., Vi. Plotini 2) Mt 27:50. J says for this παραδιδόναι τὸ πν. 19:3 (cp. ApcMos 31 ἀποδῶ τὸ πν.; Just., D. 105, 5). Of the return of the (life-)spirit of a deceased person into her dead body ἐπέστρεψεν τὸ πν. αὐτῆς Lk 8:55 (cp. Jdg 15:19). εἰς χεῖράς σου παρατίθεμαι τὸ πν. μου into your hands I entrust my spirit 23:46 (Ps 30:6; for alleged focus on ἐλπίζειν s. EBons, BZ 38, ’94, 93–101). κύριε Ἰησοῦ, δέξαι τὸ πνεῦμά μου Ac 7:59; composite of both passages AcPl Ha 10, 23 (cp. ApcMos 42). τὸ πν. μου ὁ δεσπότης δέξεται GJs 23:3 (on the pneuma flying upward after death cp. Epicharm. in Vorsokrat. 23 [=13, 4th ed.], B 9 and 22; Eur., Suppl. 533 πνεῦμα μὲν πρὸς αἰθέρα, τὸ σῶμα δʼ ἐς γῆν; PGM 1, 177ff τελευτήσαντός σου τὸ σῶμα περιστελεῖ, σοῦ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα … εἰς ἀέρα ἄξει σὺν αὑτῷ ‘when you are dead [the angel] will wrap your body … and take your spirit with him into the sky’). τὸ σῶμα χωρὶς πν. νεκρόν ἐστιν Js 2:26. πν. ζωῆς ἐκ τ. θεοῦ εἰσῆλθεν ἐν αὐτοῖς (i.e. the prophet-witnesses who have been martyred) Rv 11:11 (cp. Ezk 37:10 v.l. εἰσῆλθεν εἰς αὐτοὺς πνεῦμα ζωῆς; vs. 5). Of the spirit that animated the image of a beast, and enabled it to speak and to have Christians put to death 13:15.—After a person’s death, the πν. lives on as an independent being, in heaven πνεύματα δικαὶων τετελειωμένων Hb 12:23 (cp. Da 3:86 εὐλογεῖτε, πνεύματα καὶ ψυχαὶ δικαίων, τὸν κύριον). According to non-biblical sources, the πν. are in the netherworld (cp. En 22:3–13; Sib Or 7, 127) or in the air (PGM 1, 178), where evil spirits can prevent them from ascending higher (s. ἀήρ2b). τοῖς ἐν φυλακῇ πνεύμασιν πορευθεὶς ἐκήρυξεν 1 Pt 3:19 belongs here if it refers to Jesus’ preaching to the spirits of the dead confined in Hades (so Usteri et al.; s. also JMcCulloch, The Harrowing of Hell, 1930), whether it be when he descended into Hades, or when he returned to heaven (so RBultmann, Bekenntnis u. Liedfragmente im 1 Pt: ConNeot11, ’47, 1–14).—CClemen, Niedergefahren zu den Toten 1900; JTurmel, La Descente du Christ aux enfers 1905; JMonnier, La Descente aux enfers 1906; HHoltzmann, ARW 11, 1908, 285–97; KGschwind, Die Niederfahrt Christi in die Unterwelt 1911; DPlooij, De Descensus in 1 Pt 3:19 en 4:6: TT 47, 1913, 145–62; JBernard, The Descent into Hades a Christian Baptism (on 1 Pt 3:19ff): Exp. 8th ser., 11, 1916, 241–74; CSchmidt, Gespräche Jesu mit seinen Jüngern: TU 43, 1919, 452ff; JFrings, BZ 17, 1926, 75–88; JKroll, Gott u. Hölle ’32; RGanschinietz, Katabasis: Pauly-W. X/2, 1919, 2359–449; Clemen² 89–96; WBieder, Die Vorstellung v. d. Höllenfahrt Jesu Chr. ’49; SJohnson, JBL 79, ’60, 48–51; WDalton, Christ’s Proclamation to the Spirits ’65. S. also the lit. in Windisch, Hdb.² 1930, exc. on 1 Pt 3:20; ESelwyn, The First Ep. of St. Peter ’46 and 4c below.—This is prob. also the place for θανατωθεὶς μὲν σαρκὶ ζωοποιηθεὶς δὲ πνεύματι• ἐν ᾧ καὶ … 1 Pt 3:18f (some mss. read πνεύματι instead of πνεύμασιν in vs. 19, evidently in ref. to the manner of Jesus’ movement; πνεῦμα is that part of Christ which, in contrast to σάρξ, did not pass away in death, but survived as an individual entity after death; s. ἐν 7). Likew. the contrast κατὰ σάρκα … κατὰ πνεῦμα Ro 1:3f. Cp. 1 Ti 3:16.

③ a part of human personality, spirit

ⓐ when used with σάρξ, the flesh, it denotes the immaterial part 2 Cor 7:1; Col 2:5. Flesh and spirit=the whole personality, in its outer and inner aspects, oft. in Ign.: IMg 1:2; 13:1a; ITr ins; 12:1; IRo ins; ISm 1:1; IPol 5:1; AcPl Ant 13, 18 (=Aa I 237, 3).—In the same sense beside σῶμα, the body (Simplicius, In Epict. p. 50, 1; Ps.-Phoc. 106f; PGM 1, 178) 1 Cor 5:3–5; 7:34.—The inner life of humans is divided into ψυχὴ καὶ πνεῦμα (cp. Ps.-Pla., Axioch. 10 p. 370c τὶ θεῖον ὄντως ἐνῆν πνεῦμα τῇ ψυχῇ=a divine spirit was actually in the soul; Wsd 15:11; Jos., Ant. 1, 34; Tat. 13, 2; 15, 1 et al.; Ath. 27, 1. S. also Herm. Wr. 10, 13; 16f; PGM 4, 627; 630. ἐκ τριῶν συνεστάναι λέγουσι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος καὶ πνεύματος Did., Gen. 55, 14) Hb 4:12. Cp. Phil 1:27. τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα 1 Th 5:23 (s. GMilligan, Thess. 1908, 78f; EvDobschütz in Meyer X⁷ 1909, 230ff; EBurton, Spirit, Soul, and Flesh 1918; AFestugière, La Trichotomie des 1 Th 5:23 et la Philos. gr.: RSR 20, 1930, 385–415; CMasson, RTP 33, ’45, 97–102; FGrant, An Introd. to NT Thought ’50, 161–66). σαρκί, ψυχῇ, πνεύματι IPhld 11:2.

ⓑ as the source and seat of insight, feeling, and will, gener. as the representative part of human inner life (cp. PGM 4, 627; 3 Km 20:5; Sir 9:9 al.; Just., D. 30, 1; Did., Gen. 232, 5) ἐπιγνοὺς ὁ Ἰησοῦς τῷ πν. αὐτοῦ Mk 2:8. ἀναστενάξας τῷ πν. αὐτοῦ λέγει 8:12 (s. ἀναστενάζω). ἠγαλλίασεν τὸ πν. μου Lk 1:47 (in parallelism w. ψυχή vs. 46, as Sir 9:9). ἠγαλλιάσατο τῷ πν. 10:21 v.l., Ἰησοῦς ἐνεβριμήσατο τῷ πν. J 11:33 (s. ἐμβριμάομαι 3); Ἰης. ἐταράχθη τῷ πν. 13:21. παρωξύνετο τὸ πν. αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ Ac 17:16; ζέων τῷ πν. with spirit-fervor 18:25 (s. ζέω). τὸ παιδίον ἐκραταιοῦτο πνεύματι Lk 1:80; 2:40 v.l.; ἔθετο ὁ Παῦλος ἐν τῷ πν. Paul made up his mind Ac 19:21 (some would put this pass. in 6c, but cp. Lk 1:66 and analogous formulations Hom. et al. in L-S-J-M s.v. τίθημι A6). προσκυνήσουσιν τῷ πατρὶ ἐν πνεύματι of the spiritual, i.e. the pure, inner worship of God, that has nothing to do w. holy times, places, appurtenances, or ceremonies J 4:23; cp. vs. 24b. πν. συντετριμμένον (Ps 50:19) 1 Cl 18:17; 52:4.—2 Cl 20:4; Hv 3, 12, 2; 3, 13, 2.—This usage is also found in Paul. His conviction (s. 5 below) that the Christian possesses the (divine) πνεῦμα and thus is different fr. all other people, leads him to choose this word in preference to others, in order to characterize a believer’s inner being gener. ᾧ λατρεύω ἐν τῷ πν. μου Ro 1:9. οὐκ ἔσχηκα ἄνεσιν τῷ πν. μου 2 Cor 2:13. Cp. 7:13. As a matter of fact, it can mean simply a person’s very self or ego: τὸ πνεῦμα συμμαρτυρεῖ τῷ πνεύματι ἡμῶν the Spirit (of God) bears witness to our very self Ro 8:16 (cp. PGM 12, 327 ἠκούσθη μου τὸ πνεῦμα ὑπὸ πνεύματος οὐρανοῦ). ἀνέπαυσαν τὸ ἐμὸν πν. καὶ τὸ ὑμῶν they have refreshed both me and you 1 Cor 16:18. ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰ. Χρ. μετά τοῦ πν. (ὑμῶν) Gal 6:18; Phil 4:23; Phlm 25. Cp. 2 Ti 4:22. Likew. in Ign. τὸ ἐμὸν πν. my (unworthy) self IEph 18:1; IRo 9:3; cp. 1 Cor 2:11a—On the relation of the divine Spirit to the believer’s spiritual self, s. SWollenweider, Der Geist Gottes als Selbst der Glaubenden: ZTK 93, ’96, 163–92.—Only a part of the inner life, i.e. that which concerns the will, is meant in τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα πρόθυμον, ἡ δὲ σὰρξ ἀσθενής Mt 26:41; Mk 14:38; Pol 7:2. That which is inferior, anxiety, fear of suffering, etc. is attributed to the σάρξ.—The mng. of the expr. οἱ πτωχοὶ τῷ πνεύματι Mt 5:3 is difficult to determine w. certainty (cp. Pla., Ep. 7, 335a πένης ἀνὴρ τὴν ψυχήν. The dat. as τῇ ψυχῇ M. Ant. 6, 52; 8, 51). The sense is prob. those who are poor in their inner life, because they do not have a misdirected pride in their own spiritual riches (s. AKlöpper, Über den Sinn u. die ursprgl. Form der ersten Seligpreisung der Bergpredigt bei Mt: ZWT 37, 1894, 175–91; RKabisch, Die erste Seligpreisung: StKr 69, 1896, 195–215; KKöhler, Die ursprgl. Form der Seligpreisungen: StKr 91, 1918, 157–92; JBoehmer, De Schatkamer 17, 1923, 11–16, TT [Copenhagen] 4, 1924, 195–207, JBL 45, 1926, 298–304; WMacgregor, ET 39, 1928, 293–97; VMacchioro, JR 12, ’32, 40–49; EEvans, Theology 47, ’44, 55–60; HLeisegang, Pneuma Hagion 1922, 134ff; Betz, SM 116 n. 178 for Qumran reff.).

ⓒ spiritual state, state of mind, disposition ἐν ἀγάπῃ πνεύματί τε πραΰτητος with love and a gentle spirit 1 Cor 4:21; cp. Gal 6:1. τὸ πν. τοῦ νοὸς ὑμῶν Eph 4:23 (s. νοῦς 2a). ἐν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ τοῦ ἡσυχίου πνεύματος with the imperishable (gift) of a quiet disposition 1 Pt 3:4.

④ an independent noncorporeal being, in contrast to a being that can be perceived by the physical senses, spirit (ELangton, Good and Evil Spirits ’42).

ⓐ God personally: πνεῦμα ὁ θεός J 4:24a (Ath. 16, 2; on God as a spirit, esp. in the Stoa, s. MPohlenz, D. Stoa ’48/49. Hdb. ad loc. Also Celsus 6, 71 [Stoic]; Herm. Wr. 18, 3 ἀκάματον μέν ἐστι πνεῦμα ὁ θεός).

ⓑ good, or at least not expressly evil spirits or spirit-beings (cp. CIG III, 5858b δαίμονες καὶ πνεύματα; Proclus on Pla., Cratyl. p. 69, 6; 12 Pasqu.; En 15:4; 6; 8; 10; TestAbr A 4 p. 81, 15f [Stone p. 10, 15f] πάντα τὰ ἐπουράνια πνεύματα; TestAbr B 13 p. 117, 26 [Stone p. 82] ὑψηλὸν πν.; PGM 3, 8 ἐπικαλοῦμαί σε, ἱερὸν πνεῦμα; 4, 1448; 3080; 12, 249) πνεῦμα w. ἄγγελος (cp. Jos., Ant. 4, 108; Ps.-Clem., Hom. 3, 33; 8, 12) Ac 23:8f. God is ὁ παντὸς πνεύματος κτίστης καὶ ἐπίσκοπος 1 Cl 59:3b.—Pl., God the μόνος εὐεργέτης πνεύματων 1 Cl 59:3a. Cp. 64 (s. on this Num 16:22; 27:16. Prayers for vengeance fr. Rheneia [Dssm., LO 351–55=LAE 423ff=SIG 1181, 2] τὸν θεὸν τὸν κύριον τῶν πνευμάτων; PGM 5, 467 θεὸς θεῶν, ὁ κύριος τῶν πν.; sim. the magic pap PWarr 21, 24; 26 [III A.D.]); the πατὴρ τῶν πνευμάτων Hb 12:9. Intermediary beings (in polytheistic terminology: δαίμονες) that serve God are called λειτουργικὰ πνεύματα Hb 1:14. In Rv we read of the ἑπτὰ πνεύματα (τοῦ θεοῦ) 1:4; 3:1; 4:5; 5:6; s. ASkrinjar, Biblica 16, ’35, 1–24; 113–40.— Ghost Lk 24:37, 39.

ⓒ evil spirits (PGM 13, 798; 36, 160; TestJob 27, 2; ApcSed [both Satan]; AscIs 3:28; Just., D. 39, 6 al.; Ath. 25, 3), esp. in accounts of healing in the Synoptics: (τὸ) πνεῦμα (τὸ) ἀκάθαρτον (Just., D. 82, 3) Mt 12:43; Mk 1:23, 26; 3:30; 5:2, 8; 7:25; 9:25a; Lk 8:29; 9:42; 11:24; Rv 18:2. Pl. (TestBenj 5:2) Mt 10:1; Mk 1:27; 3:11; 5:13; 6:7; Lk 4:36; 6:18; Ac 5:16; 8:7; Rv 16:13; ending of Mk in the Freer ms.—τὸ πν. τὸ πονηρόν Ac 19:15f. Pl. (En 99:7; TestSim 4:9; 6:6, TestJud 16:1; Just., D. 76, 6) Lk 7:21; 8:2; Ac 19:12f.—πν. ἄλαλον Mk 9:17; cp. vs. 25b (s. ἄλαλος). πν. πύθων Ac 16:16 (s. πύθων). πν. ἀσθενείας Lk 13:11. Cp. 1 Ti 4:1b. πνεῦμα δαιμονίου ἀκαθάρτου (s. δαιμόνιον 2) Lk 4:33. πνεύματα δαιμονίων Rv 16:14 (in effect = personified ‘exhalations’ of evil powers; for the combination of πν. and δαιμ. cp. the love spell Sb 4324, 16f τὰ πνεύματα τῶν δαιμόνων τούτων).—Abs. of a harmful spirit Mk 9:20; Lk 9:39; Ac 16:18. Pl. Mt 8:16; 12:45; Lk 10:20; 11:26.—1 Pt 3:19 (s. 2 above) belongs here if the πνεύματα refer to hostile spirit-powers, evil spirits, fallen angels (so FSpitta, Christi Predigt an die Geister 1890; HGunkel, Zum religionsgesch. Verständnis des NT 1903, 72f; WBousset, ZNW 19, 1920, 50–66; Rtzst., Herr der Grösse 1919, 25ff; Knopf, Windisch, FHauck ad loc.; BReicke, The Disobedient Spirits and Christian Baptism ’46, esp. 54–56, 69).—Hermas also has the concept of evil spirits that lead an independent existence, and live and reign within the inner life of a pers.; the Holy Spirit, who also lives or would like to live there, is forced out by them (cp. TestDan 4) Hm 5, 1, 2–4; 5, 2, 5–8; 10, 1, 2. τὸ πν. τὸ ἅγιον … ἕτερον πονηρὸν πν. 5, 1, 2. These πνεύματα are ὀξυχολία 5, 1, 3; 5, 2, 8 (τὸ πονηρότατον πν.); 10, 1, 2; διψυχία 9:11 (ἐπίγειον πν. ἐστι παρὰ τοῦ διαβόλου); 10, 1, 2; λύπη 10, 1, 2 (πάντων τῶν πνευμάτων πονηροτέρα) and other vices. On the complicated pneuma-concept of the Mandates of Hermas s. MDibelius, Hdb. exc. on Hm 5, 2, 7; cp. Leutzsch, Hermas 453f n. 133.

⑤ God’s being as controlling influence, with focus on association with humans, Spirit, spirit as that which differentiates God fr. everything that is not God, as the divine power that produces all divine existence, as the divine element in which all divine life is carried on, as the bearer of every application of the divine will. All those who belong to God possess or receive this spirit and hence have a share in God’s life. This spirit also serves to distinguish Christians fr. all unbelievers (cp. PGM 4, 1121ff, where the spirit is greeted as one who enters devotees and, in accordance w. God’s will, separates them fr. themselves, i.e. fr. the purely human part of their nature); for this latter aspect s. esp. 6 below.

ⓐ the Spirit of God, of the Lord (=God) etc. (LXX; TestSim 4:4; JosAs 8:11; ApcSed 14:6; 15:6; ApcMos 43; SibOr 3, 701; Ps.-Phoc. 106; Philo; Joseph. [s. c below]; apolog. Cp. Plut., Numa 4, 6 πνεῦμα θεοῦ, capable of begetting children; s. παρθένος a) τὸ πν. τοῦ θεοῦ 1 Cor 2:11b, 14; 3:16; 6:11; 1J 4:2a (Just., D. 49, 3; Tat. 13, 3; Ath. 22, 3). τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πν. 1 Pt 4:14 (Just., A I, 60, 6). τὸ πν. τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ 1 Cor 2:12b. τὸ πν. κυρίου Ac 5:9; B 6:14; B 9:2 (cp. Mel., P. 32, 222). τὸ πνεῦμά μου or αὐτοῦ: Mt 12:18 (Is 42:1); Ac 2:17f (Jo 3:1f.—Cp. 1QS 4:21); 1 Cor 2:10a v.l.; Eph 3:16; 1 Th 4:8 (where τὸ ἅγιον is added); 1J 4:13.—τὸ πν. τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν Mt 10:20. τὸ πν. τοῦ ἐγείραντος τὸν Ἰησοῦν Ro 8:11a.—Without the art. πν. θεοῦ (JosAs 4:9; Tat. 15:3; Theoph. Ant. 1, 5 [p. 66, 18]) the Spirit of God Mt 3:16; 12:28; Ro 8:9b, 14, 19; 1 Cor 7:40; 12:3a; 2 Cor 3:3 (πν. θεοῦ ζῶντος); Phil 3:3. πν. κυρίου Lk 4:18 (Is 61:1); Ac 8:39 (like J 3:8; 20:22; Ac 2:4, this pass. belongs on the borderline betw. the mngs. ‘wind’ and ‘spirit’; cp. Diod S 3, 60, 3 Ἕσπερον ἐξαίφνης ὑπὸ πνευμάτων συναρπαγέντα μεγάλων ἄφαντον γενέσθαι ‘Hesperus [a son of Atlas] was suddenly snatched by strong winds and vanished fr. sight’. S. HLeisegang, Der Hl. Geist I 1, 1919, 19ff; OCullmann, TZ. 4, ’48, 364); 1 Cl 21:2.

ⓑ the Spirit of Christ, of the Lord (=Christ) etc. τὸ πν. Ἰησοῦ Ac 16:7. τὸ πν. Χριστοῦ AcPlCor 2:32. τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς πν. Χριστοῦ 1 Pt 1:11. πν. Χριστοῦ Ro 8:9c. πν. τοῦ Χριστοῦ AcPl Ha 8, 18. ἀπὸ τοῦ πν. τοῦ χριστοῦ AcPlCor 2:10. τὸ πν. Ἰης. Χριστοῦ Phil 1:19. τὸ πν. κυρίου 2 Cor 3:17b (JHermann, Kyrios und Pneuma, ’61). τὸ πν. τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ (=θεοῦ) Gal 4:6. As possessor of the divine Spirit, and at the same time controlling its distribution among humans, Christ is called κύριος πνεύματος Lord of the Spirit 2 Cor 3:18 (s. Windisch ad loc.); but many prefer to transl. from the Lord who is the Spirit.—CMoule, OCullmann Festschr., ’72, 231–37.

ⓒ Because of its heavenly origin and nature this Spirit is called (the) Holy Spirit (cp. PGM 4, 510 ἵνα πνεύσῃ ἐν ἐμοὶ τὸ ἱερὸν πνεῦμα.—Neither Philo nor Josephus called the Spirit πν. ἅγιον; the former used θεῖον or θεοῦ πν., the latter πν. θεῖον: Ant. 4, 118; 8, 408; 10, 239; but ἅγιον πνεῦμα Orig. C. Cels 1, 40, 16).

α. w. the art. τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον (Is 63:10f; Ps 50:13; 142:10 v.l.; cp. Sus 45 Theod.; TestAbr A 4 p. 81, 10 [Stone p. 10]; JosAs 8:11 [codd. ADE]; AscIs 3, 15, 26; Just., D. 36, 6 al.) Mt 12:32 = Mk 3:29 = Lk 12:10 (τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα; on the ‘sin against the Holy Spirit’ s. HLeisegang, Pneuma Hagion 1922, 96–112; AFridrichsen, Le péché contre le Saint-Esprit: RHPR 3, 1923, 367–72). Mk 12:36; 13:11; Lk 2:26; 3:22; 10:21; J 14:26; Ac 1:16; 2:33; 5:3, 32; 7:51; 8:18 v.l.; 10:44, 47; 11:15; 13:2; 15:8, 28; 19:6; 20:23, 28; 21:11; 28:25; Eph 1:13 (τὸ πν. τῆς ἐπαγγελίας τὸ ἅγιον); 4:30 (τὸ πν. τὸ ἅγιον τοῦ θεοῦ); Hb 3:7; 9:8; 10:15; 1 Cl 13:1; 16:2; 18:11 (Ps 50:13); 22:1; IEph 9:1; Hs 5, 5, 2; 5, 6, 5–7 (on the relationship of the Holy Spirit to the Son in Hermas s. ALink, Christi Person u. Werk im Hirten des Hermas 1886; JvWalter, ZNW 14, 1913, 133–44; MDibelius, Hdb. exc. following Hs 5, 6, 8 p. 572–76).—τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα (Wsd 9:17; OdeSol 11:2; TestJob 51:2; ApcEsdr 7:16; Just. D. 25, 1 al.) Mt 28:19; Lk 12:10 (s. above), 12; Ac 1:8; 2:38 (epexegetic gen.); 4:31; 9:31; 10:45; 13:4; 16:6; 1 Cor 6:19; 2 Cor 13:13; 1J 5:7 v.l. (on the Comma Johanneum s. λόγο 3); GJs 24:4 (s. χρηματίζω 1bα). As the mother of Jesus GHb 20, 61 (HLeisegang, Pneuma Hagion 1922, 64ff; SHirsch, D. Vorstellg. v. e. weibl. πνεῦμα ἅγ. im NT u. in d. ältesten christl. Lit. 1927. Also WBousset, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis 1907, 9ff).

β. without the art. (s. B-D-F §257, 2; Rob. 761; 795) πνεῦμα ἅγιον (PGM 3, 289; Da 5:12 LXX; PsSol 17:37; AssMos Fgm. b; Just., D. 4, 1 al.; Ath. 24, 1. S. also Da Theod. 4:8, 9, 18 θεοῦ πνεῦμα ἅγιον or πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἅγιον) Mk 1:8; Lk 1:15, 35, 41, 67; 2:25; 4:1; 11:13; J 20:22 (Cassien, La pentecôte johannique [J 20:19–23] ’39.—See also 1QS 4:20f); Ac 2:4a; 4:8; 7:55; 8:15, 17, 19; 9:17; 10:38; 11:24; 13:9; 19:2ab; Hb 2:4; 6:4; 1 Pt 1:12 v.l.; 1 Cl 2:2; AcPl 6:18; 9:4 (restored after Aa I 110, 11); AcPlCor 2:5.—So oft. in combination w. a prep.: διὰ πνεύματος ἁγίου Ac 1:2; 4:25; Ro 5:5; 2 Ti 1:14; 1 Cl 8:1 (cp. διὰ πν. αἰωνίου Hb 9:14). διὰ φωνῆς πν. ἁγίου AcPl Ha 11, 6. ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου (Eus., PE 3, 12, 3 of the Egyptians: ἐκ τ. πνεύματος οἴονται συλλαμβάνειν τὸν γῦπα. Here πνεῦμα= ‘wind’; s. Horapollo 1, 11 p. 14f. The same of other birds since Aristot.—On the neut. πνεῦμα as a masc. principle cp. Aristoxenus, Fgm. 13 of the two original principles: πατέρα μὲν φῶς, μητέρα δὲ σκότος) Mt 1:18, 20; IEph 18:2; GJs 14:2; 19:1 (pap). ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ (PsSol 17:37; ApcZeph; Ar. 15, 1) Mt 3:11; Mk 1:8 v.l.; Lk 3:16; J 1:33b; Ac 1:5 (cp. 1QS 3:7f); 11:16; Ro 9:1; 14:17; 15:16; 1 Cor 12:3b; 2 Cor 6:6; 1 Th 1:5; 1 Pt 1:12 (without ἐν v.l.); Jd 20. ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου 2 Pt 1:21. Cp. ἐν δυνάμει πνεύματος ἁγίου Ro 15:13, 19 v.l. (for πνεύματος θεοῦ). μετὰ χαρᾶς πνεύματος ἁγίου 1 Th 1:6. διὰ ἀνακαινώσεως πνεύματος ἁγίου Tit 3:5.

ⓓ abs.

α. w. the art. τὸ πνεῦμα. In this connection the art. is perh. used anaphorically at times, w. the second mention of a word (s. B-D-F §252; Rob. 762); perh. Mt 12:31 (looking back to vs. 28 πν. θεοῦ); Mk 1:10, 12 (cp. vs. 8 πν. ἅγιον); Lk 4:1b, 14 (cp. vs. 1a); Ac 2:4b (cp. vs. 4a).—As a rule it is not possible to assume that anaphora is present: Mt 4:1; J 1:32, 33a; 3:6a, 8b (in wordplay), 34; 7:39a; Ac 8:29; 10:19; 11:12, 28; 19:1 D; 20:3 D, 22; 21:4; Ro 8:23 (ἀπαρχή 1bβ; 2), 26a, 27; 12:11; 15:30; 2 Cor 1:22 and 5:5 (KErlemann, ZNW 83, ’92, 202–23, and s. ἀρραβών); 12:18 (τῷ αὐτῷ πν.); Gal 3:2, 5, 14 (ἐπαγγελία 1bβ); Eph 4:3 (gen. of the author); 6:17 (perh. epexegetic gen.); 1 Ti 4:1a; Js 4:5; 1J 3:24; 5:6ab (some mss. add καὶ πνεύματος to the words διʼ ὕδατος κ. αἵματος at the beg. of the verse; this is approved by HvSoden, Moffatt, Vogels, Merk, and w. reservations by CDodd, The Joh. Epistles ’46, TManson, JTS 48, ’47, 25–33), vs. 8; Rv 2:7, 11, 17, 29; 3:6, 13, 22; 14:13; 22:17; B 19:2, B 7= D 4:10 (s. ἐτοιμάζω b). ἐν τῷ πνεύματι (led) by the Spirit Lk 2:27.—Paul links this Spirit of God, known to every Christian, with Christ as liberating agent in contrast to legal constraint ὁ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμα ἐστιν the Lord means Spirit 2 Cor 3:17a (UHolzmeister, 2 Cor 3:17 Dominus autem Spiritus est 1908; JNisius, Zur Erklärung v. 2 Cor 3:16ff: ZKT 40, 1916, 617–75; JKögel, Ὁ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν: ASchlatter Festschr. 1922, 35–46; C Guignebert, Congr. d’Hist. du Christ. II 1928, 7–22; EFuchs, Christus u. d. Geist b. Pls ’32; HHughes, ET 45, ’34, 235f; CLattey, Verb. Dom. 20, ’40, 187–89; DGriffiths ET 55, ’43, 81–83; HIngo, Kyrios und Pneuma, ’61 [Paul]; JDunn, JTS 21, ’70, 309–20).

β. without the art. πνεῦμα B 1:3. κοινωνία πνεύματος Phil 2:1 (κοινωνία 1 and 2). πνεύματι in the Spirit or through the Spirit Gal 3:3; 5:5, 16, 18; 1 Pt 4:6. εἰ ζῶμεν πνεύματι, πνεύματι καὶ στοιχῶμεν if we live by the Spirit, let us also walk by the Spirit Gal 5:25. Freq. used w. a prep.: διὰ πνεύματος 1 Pt 1:22 v.l. ἐξ (ὕδατος καὶ) πνεύματος J 3:5. ἐν πνεύματι in, by, through the Spirit Mt 22:43; Eph 2:22; 3:5; 5:18; 6:18; Col 1:8 (ἀγάπη ἐν πνεύματι love called forth by the Spirit); B 9:7. κατὰ πνεῦμα Ro 8:4f; Gal 4:29. ἐν ἁγιασμῷ πνεύματος 2 Th 2:13; 1 Pt 1:2 (s. ἁγιασμός).—In neg. expressions: οὔπω ἧν πνεῦμα the Spirit had not yet come J 7:39b. ψυχικοὶ πνεῦμα μὴ ἔχοντες worldly people, who do not have the Spirit Jd 19.—ἓν πνεῦμα one and the same Spirit 1 Cor 12:13; Eph 2:18; 4:4; one (in) Spirit 1 Cor 6:17.

ⓔ The Spirit is more closely defined by a gen. of thing: τὸ πν. τῆς ἀληθείας (TestJud 20:5) J 14:17; 15:26; 16:13 (in these three places the Spirit of Truth is the Paraclete promised by Jesus upon his departure); 1J 4:6 (opp. τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης, as TestJud 20:1; PsSol 8:14 πλ. πλανήσεως; Just., D. 7, 3 πλάνου καὶ ἀκαθάρτου πνεύματος; cp. 1QS 4:23); τὸ τῆς δόξης πν. 1 Pt 4:14. τὸ πν. τῆς ζωῆς the Spirit of life Ro 8:2. το πν. τῆς πίστεως 2 Cor 4:13. πν. σοφίας καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως Eph 1:17 (cp. Just., D. 87, 4). πν. υἱοθεσίας Ro 8:15b (opp. πν. δουλείας vs. 15a). πν. δυνάμεως AcPl Ha 8, 25. πν. δυνάμεως καὶ ἀγάπης καὶ σωφρονισμοῦ 2 Ti 1:7 (opp. πν. δειλίας). τὸ πν. τῆς χάριτος (s. TestJud 24:2) Hb 10:29 (Zech 12:10); cp. 1 Cl 46:6.

ⓕ Of Christ ‘it is written’ in Scripture: (ἐγένετο) ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζῳοποιοῦν 1 Cor 15:45. The scripture pass. upon which the first part of this verse is based is Gen 2:7, where Wsd 15:11 also substitutes the words πνεῦμα ζωτικόν for πνοὴν ζωῆς (cp. Just., D. 6, 2). On the other hand, s. Philo, Leg. All. 1, 42 and s. the lit. s.v. Ἀδάμ ad loc.

ⓖ The (divine) Pneuma stands in contrast to everything that characterizes this age or the finite world gener.: οὐ τὸ πν. τοῦ κόσμου ἀλλὰ τὸ πν. τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ 1 Cor 2:12; cp. Eph 2:2 and 1 Ti 4:1ab.

α. in contrast to σάρξ, which is more closely connected w. sin than any other earthly material (Just., D. 135, 6): J 3:6; Ro 8:4–6, 9a, 13; Gal 3:3; 5:17ab; 6:8. Cp. B 10:9. πᾶσα ἐπιθυμία κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος στρατεύεται Pol 5:3.

β. in contrast to σῶμα (=σάρξ) Ro 8:10 and to σάρξ (=σῶμα, as many hold) J 6:63a (for τὸ πν. ἐστιν τὸ ζῳοποιοῦν cp. Philo, Op. Mund. 30; Herm. Wr. in Cyrill., C. Jul. I 556c=542, 24 Sc. the pneuma τὰ πάντα ζῳοποιεῖ καὶ τρέφει. S. also f above). Cp. Ro 8:11b.

γ. in contrast to γράμμα, which is the characteristic quality of God’s older declaration of the divine will in the law: Ro 2:29; 7:6; 2 Cor 3:6ab, 8 (cp. vs. 7).

δ. in contrast to the wisdom of humans 1 Cor 2:13.

⑥ the Spirit of God as exhibited in the character or activity of God’s people or selected agents, Spirit, spirit (s. HPreisker, Geist u. Leben ’33).

ⓐ πνεῦμα is accompanied by another noun, which characterizes the working of the Spirit more definitely: πνεῦμα καὶ δύναμις spirit and power Lk 1:17; 1 Cor 2:4. Cp. Ac 10:38; 1 Th 1:5. πνεῦμα καὶ ζωή J 6:63b. πνεῦμα κ. σοφία Ac 6:3; cp. vs. 10 (cp. TestReub 2:6 πνεῦμα λαλίας). πίστις κ. πνεῦμα ἅγιον 6:5 (cp. Just., D. 135, 6). χαρὰ καὶ πνεῦμα ἅγ. 13:52.

ⓑ Unless frustrated by humans in their natural condition, the Spirit of God produces a spiritual type of conduct Gal 5:16, 25 and produces the καρπὸς τοῦ πνεύματος vs. 22 (s. Vögtle under πλεονεξία).

ⓒ The Spirit inspires certain people of God B 12:2; B 13:5, above all, in their capacity as proclaimers of a divine revelation (Strabo 9, 3, 5 the πνεῦμα ἐνθουσιαστικόν, that inspired the Pythia; Περὶ ὕψους 13, 2; 33, 5 of the divine πν. that impels prophets and poets to express themselves; schol. on Pla. 856e of a μάντις: ἄνωθεν λαμβάνειν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ πληροῦσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ; Aristobulus in Eus., PE 8, 10, 4 [=Fgm. 2, 4 p. 136 Holladay] τὸ θεῖον πν., καθʼ ὸ̔ καὶ προφήτης ἀνακεκήρυκται ‘[Moses possessed] the Divine Spirit with the result that he was proclaimed a prophet’; AscIs 1:7 τὸ πν. τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν ἐμοί; AssMos Fgm. f εἶδεν πνεύματι ἐπαρθείς; Just., A I, 38, 1 al.; Ath. 10, 3 τὸ προφητικὸν πν. Cp. Marinus, Vi. Procli 23 of Proclus: οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ θείας ἐπινοίας … διαλέγεσθαι; Orig., C. Cels. 3, 28, 23). προφητεία came into being only as ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι ἐλάλησαν ἀπὸ θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι 2 Pt 1:21; cp. Ac 15:29 v.l.; cp. 1 Cl 8:1. David Mt 22:43; Mk 12:36; cp. Ac 1:16; 4:25. Isaiah Ac 28:25. Moses B 10:2, B 9; the Spirit was also active in giving the tables of the law to Moses 14:2. Christ himself spoke in the OT διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ ἁγίου 1 Cl 22:1. The ἱεραὶ γραφαί are called αἱ διὰ τοῦ πν. τοῦ ἁγίου 45:2.—The Christian prophet Agabus also ἐσήμαινεν διὰ τοῦ πν. Ac 11:28; cp. Ac 21:11. Likew. Ign. IPhld 7:2. In general the Spirit reveals the most profound secrets to those who believe 1 Cor 2:10ab.—1 Cl claims to be written διὰ τοῦ ἁγ. πν. 63:2. On Ac 19:21 s. 3b.

ⓓ The Spirit of God, being one, shows the variety and richness of its life in the different kinds of spiritual gifts which are granted to certain Christians 1 Cor 12:4, 7, 11; cp. vs. 13ab.—Vss. 8–10 enumerate the individual gifts of the Spirit, using various prepositions: διὰ τοὺ πν. vs. 8a; κατὰ τὸ πν. vs. 8b; ἐν τῷ πν. vs. 9ab. τὸ πν. μὴ σβέννυτε do not quench the Spirit 1 Th 5:19 refers to the gift of prophecy, acc. to vs. 20.—The use of the pl. πνεύματα is explained in 1 Cor 14:12 by the varied nature of the Spirit’s working; in vs. 32 by the number of persons who possess the prophetic spirit; on the latter s. Rv 22:6 and 19:10.

ⓔ One special type of spiritual gift is represented by ecstatic speaking. Of those who ‘speak in tongues’ that no earthly person can understand: πνεύματι λαλεῖ μυστήρια expresses secret things in a spiritual way 1 Cor 14:2. Cp. vss. 14–16 and s. νοῦς 1b. τὸ πνεῦμα ὑπερεντυγχάνει στεναγμοῖς ἀλαλήτοις the Spirit pleads in our behalf with groans beyond words Ro 8:26b. Of speech that is ecstatic, but expressed in words that can be understood λαλεῖν ἐν πνεύματι D 11:7, 8; cp. vs. 9 (on the subject-matter 1 Cor 12:3; Jos., Ant. 4, 118f; TestJob 43:2 ἀναλαβὼν Ἐλιφᾶς πν. εἶπεν ὕμνον). Of the state of mind of the seer of the Apocalypse: ἐν πνεύματι Rv 17:3; 21:10; γενέσθαι ἐν πν. 1:10; 4:2 (s. γίνομαι 5c, ἐν 4c and EMoering, StKr 92, 1920, 148–54; RJeske, NTS 31, ’85, 452–66); AcPl Ha 6, 27. On the Spirit at Pentecost Ac 2:4 s. KLake: Beginn. I 5, ’33, 111–21. κατασταλέντος τοῦ πν. τοῦ ἐν Μύρτῃ when the Spirit (of prophecy) that was in Myrta ceased speaking AcPl Ha 7, 9.

ⓕ The Spirit leads and directs Christian missionaries in their journeys (Aelian, NA 11, 16 the young women are led blindfolded to the cave of the holy serpent; they are guided by a πνεῦμα θεῖον) Ac 16:6, 7 (by dreams, among other methods; cp. vs. 9f and s. Marinus, Vi. Procli 27: Proclus ἔφασκεν προθυμηθῆναι μὲν πολλάκις γράψαι, κωλυθῆναι δὲ ἐναργῶς ἔκ τινων ἐνυπνίων). In Ac 16:6–7 τὸ ἅγιον πν. and τὸ πν. Ἰησοῦ are distinguished.

⑦ an activating spirit that is not fr. God, spirit: πν. ἔτερον a different (kind of) spirit 2 Cor 11:4. Cp. 2 Th 2:2; 1J 4:1–3. Because there are persons activated by such spirits, it is necessary to test the var. kinds of spirits (the same problem Artem. 3, 20 περὶ διαφορᾶς μάντεων, οἷς δεῖ προσέχειν καὶ οἷς μή) 1 Cor 12:10; 1J 4:1b. ὁ διάβολος πληροῖ αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ πν. Hm 11:3. Also οὐκ οἴδατε ποίου πνεύματός ἐστε Lk 9:55 v.l. distinguishes betw. the spirit shown by Jesus’ disciples, and another kind of spirit.—Even more rarely a spirit divinely given that is not God’s own; so (in a quot. fr. Is 29:10) a πνεῦμα κατανύξεως Ro 11:8.

⑧ an independent transcendent personality, the Spirit, which appears in formulas that became more and more fixed and distinct (cp. Ath. 12, 2; Hippol., Ref. 7, 26, 2.—Ps.-Lucian, Philopatr. 12 θεόν, υἱόν πατρός, πνεῦμα ἐκ πατρὸς ἐκπορευόμενον ἓν ἐκ τριῶν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς τρία, ταῦτα νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τόνδʼ ἡγοῦ θεόν=‘God, son of the father, spirit proceeding from the father, one from three and three from one, consider these as Zeus, think of this one as God’. The entire context bears a Christian impress.—As Aion in gnostic speculation Iren. 1, 2, 5 [Harv. I 21, 2]): βαπτίζοντες αὐτοὺς εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος Mt 28:19 (on the text s. βαπτίζω 2c; on the subject-matter GWalther, Die Entstehung des Taufsymbols aus dem Taufritus: StKr 95, 1924, 256ff); D 7:1, 3. Cp. 2 Cor 13:13; 1 Cl 58:2; IEph 9:1; IMg 13:1b, 2; MPol 14:3; 22:1, 3; Epil Mosq 5. On this s. HUsener, Dreiheit: RhM 58, 1903, 1ff; 161ff; 321ff; esp. 36ff; EvDobschütz, Zwei-u. dreigliedrige Formeln: JBL 50, ’31, 116–47 (also Heinrici Festschr. 1914, 92–100); Norden, Agn. Th. 228ff; JMainz, Die Bed. der Dreizahl im Judentum 1922; Clemen² 125–28; NSöderblom, Vater, Sohn u. Geist 1909; DNielsen, Der dreieinige Gott I 1922; GKrüger, Das Dogma v. der Dreieinigkeit 1905, 46ff; AHarnack, Entstehung u. Entwicklung der Kirchenverfassung 1910, 187ff; JHaussleiter, Trinitarischer Glaube u. Christusbekenntnis in der alten Kirche: BFCT XXV 4, 1920; JLebreton, Histoire du dogme de la Trinité I: Les origines⁶ 1927; RBlümel, Pls u. d. dreieinige Gott 1929.—On the whole word FRüsche, D. Seelenpneuma ’33; HLeisegang, Der Hl. Geist I 1, 1919; EBurton, ICC Gal 1921, 486–95; PVolz, Der Geist Gottes u. d. verwandten Erscheinungen im AT 1910; JHehn, Zum Problem des Geistes im alten Orient u. im AT: ZAW n.s. 2, 1925, 210–25; SLinder, Studier till Gamla Testamentets föreställningar om anden 1926; AMarmorstein, Der Hl. Geist in der rabb. Legende: ARW 28, 1930, 286–303; NSnaith, The Distinctive Ideas of the OT ’46, 229–37; FDillistone, Bibl. Doctrine of the Holy Spirit: Theology Today 3, ’46/47, 486–97; TNicklin, Gospel Gleanings ’50, 341–46; ESchweizer, CDodd Festschr., ’56, 482–508; DLys, Rûach, Le Souffle dans l’AT, ’62; DHill, Gk. Words and Hebr. Mngs. ’67, 202–93.—HGunkel, Die Wirkungen des Hl. Geistes² 1899; HWeinel, Die Wirkungen des Geistes u. der Geister im nachap. Zeitalter 1899; EWinstanley, The Spirit in the NT 1908; HSwete, The Holy Spirit in the NT 1909, The Holy Spirit in the Ancient Church 1912; EScott, The Spirit in the NT 1923; FBüchsel, Der Geist Gottes im NT 1926; EvDobschütz, Der Geistbesitz des Christen im Urchristentum: Monatsschr. für Pastoral-theol. 20, 1924, 228ff; FBadcock, ‘The Spirit’ and Spirit in the NT: ET 45, ’34, 218–21; RBultmann, Theologie des NT ’48, 151–62 (Eng. tr. KGrobel, ’51, I 153–64); ESchweizer, Geist u. Gemeinde im NT ’52, Int 6, ’52, 259–78.—WTosetti, Der Hl. Geist als göttliche Pers. in den Evangelien 1918; HLeisegang, Pneuma Hagion. Der Ursprung des Geistbegriffs der Syn. Ev. aus der griech. Mystik 1922; AFrövig, Das Sendungsbewusstsein Jesu u. der Geist 1924; HWindisch, Jes. u. d. Geist nach Syn. Überl.: Studies in Early Christianity, presented to FCPorter and BWBacon 1928, 209–36; FSynge, The Holy Spirit in the Gospels and Acts: CQR 120, ’35, 205–17; CBarrett, The Holy Spirit and the Gospel Trad. ’47.—ESokolowski, Die Begriffe Geist u. Leben bei Pls 1903; KDeissner, Auferstehungshoffnung u. Pneumagedanke bei Pls 1912; GVos, The Eschatological Aspect of the Pauline Conception of the Spirit: Bibl. and Theol. Studies by the Faculty of Princeton Theol. Sem. 1912, 209–59; HBertrams, Das Wesen des Geistes nach d. Anschauung des Ap. Pls 1913; WReinhard, Das Wirken des Hl. Geistes im Menschen nach den Briefen des Ap. Pls 1918; HHoyle, The Holy Spirit in St. Paul 1928; PGächter, Z. Pneumabegriff des hl. Pls: ZKT 53, 1929, 345–408; ASchweitzer, D. Mystik des Ap. Pls 1930, 159–74 al. [Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, tr. WMontgomery ’31, 160–76 al.]; E-BAllo, RB 43, ’34, 321–46 [1 Cor]; Ltzm., Hdb. exc. after Ro 8:11; Synge [s. above], CQR 119, ’35, 79–93 [Pauline epp.]; NWaaning, Onderzoek naar het gebruik van πνεῦμα bij Pls, diss. Amsterd. ’39; RJewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms, ’71, 167–200.—HvBaer, Der Hl. Geist in den Lukasschriften 1926; MGoguel, La Notion joh. de l’Esprit 1902; JSimpson, The Holy Spirit in the Fourth Gospel: Exp., 9th ser., 4, 1925, 292–99; HWindisch, Jes. u. d. Geist im J.: Amicitiae Corolla (RHarris Festschr.) ’33, 303–18; WLofthouse, The Holy Spirit in Ac and J: ET 52, ’40/41, 334–36; CBarrett, The Holy Spirit in the Fourth Gospel: JTS 1 n.s., ’50, 1–15; FCrump, Pneuma in the Gospels, diss. Catholic Univ. of America, ’54; GLampe, Studies in the Gospels (RHLightfoot memorial vol.) ’55, 159–200; NHamilton, The Holy Spirit and Eschatology in Paul, ’57; WDavies, Paul and the Dead Sea Scrolls, Flesh and Spirit: The Scrolls and the NT, ed. KStendahl, ’57, 157–82.—GJohnston, ‘Spirit’ and ‘Holy Spirit’ in the Qumran Lit.: NT Sidelights (ACPurdy Festschr.) ’60, 27–42; JPryke, ‘Spirit’ and ‘Flesh’ in Qumran and NT, RevQ 5, ’65, 346–60; HBraun, Qumran und d. NT II, ’66, 150–64; DHill, Greek Words and Hebrew Meanings, ’67, 202–93; WBieder, Pneumatolog. Aspekte im Hb, OCullmann Festschr. ’72, 251–59; KEasley, The Pauline Usage of πνεύματι as a Reference to the Spirit of God: JETS 27, ’84, 299–313 (statistics).—B. 260; 1087. Pauly-W. XIV 387–412. BHHW I 534–37. Schmidt, Syn. II 218–50. New Docs 4, 38f. DELG s.v. πνέω. M-M. Dict. de la Bible XI 126–398. EDNT. TW. Sv.